

Preface to the Kirkland-Thurman Interviews

I. Background. This narrative provides the context and background of a series of interviews conducted by Dr. Faris Russell Kirkland with General Maxwell Reid Thurman after Thurman's retirement in 1991 but not long before his death in late 1995.

General Thurman was a principal architect of the All-Volunteer Army, having served in the late 1970s as Commander of the Army's Recruiting Command and then in the early 1980s as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER)—periods of enormous challenge for the Army's personnel system. It was during this period that Thurman is credited with vastly improving the quality of the average soldier and ingraining the notion and impact of "Human Dimensionality" throughout the Army, its systems and for the first time a policy focus on Army Families. Thurman successfully institutionalized this notion of Human Dimensionality beginning with his assignments in the Program, Analysis and Evaluation Office (PA&E) experiences on the Army Staff where he noted the creative impact of data and its utilization upon program and policy development. During his subsequent senior level assignments within the personnel arena, Thurman coupled his PA&E experiences with his unique and detailed knowledge of the various systems to vastly improve both the Army's recruitment and retention processes by manipulating enlistment/reenlistment bonuses to Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and/or grade to achieve the appropriate end strength. Under Thurman's guidance "the modern professional Army came into existence."

Following his assignment as the DCSPER, General Thurman served as the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army (VCSA) from 1983 to 1987. He orchestrated the Army's procurement, staffing, fielding, and integration efforts that included the M1 Abrams, the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the UH-60 Blackhawk, the AH-64 Apache, the SINCGARS, and the ATACMS into the Active, National Guard, and Reserve Components of the Army. Again, Thurman drove integration of the MANpower and PeRsonnel INTeGration (MANPRINT) Process into the Army's weapons systems development. He also was instrumental in the creation/transition of the four light infantry divisions (6th, 7th, 10th, and 25th).

After assuming the position of Commander, Training and Doctrine Command in 1987, General Thurman placed primary emphasis on training the officer and enlisted corps with a focus on the specific field combat skills required by their respective MOS and grade. The successful completion of these skills was then evaluated using performance-based metrics. He was also instrumental in the development of the Battle Command Training Program/Tactical Commanders Battle Training Program whose success was later demonstrated in Desert Shield and the Gulf War.

In his final assignment as Commander, SOUTHCOM, General Thurman directed the planning and execution of "Operation Just Cause," the United States invasion of Panama in 1989. Most notably, this operation resulted in the apprehension and extraction of General Manuel Noriega, the de facto ruler of Panama.

Known by the nickname "Mad Max," due to his image as a workaholic, General Thurman was considered an exceptional senior leader and had a widespread reputation as a brilliant conceptual thinker, master organizer, and strategic systems manager.

General Thurman learned that he had an aggressive form of leukemia in July 1990. He officially retired from the Army in February 1991 after a distinguished 37-year career. General Thurman died at the age of 64 on December 1, 1995, at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC. After Thurman died, the *New York Times* described General Thurman as “a principal architect of the all-volunteer United States Army.” Given his varied senior level assignments within the Army, both command and staff, there is little doubt that General Thurman was not only a principal architect of the All-Volunteer Army, he was a “guarantor” for the All-Volunteer Army and thus ingrained Human Dimensionally into the fabric of the Army. Lesser known, but clearly demonstrated within the context of these interviews, is Thurman’s legacy in shaping and establishing a sea change in the Army’s notion of Training, Leadership/Leader Development and Procurement/Logistics. Thurman’s recruiting slogan of “Be All You Can Be” hallmarked both his career and service to his country.

II. Origin of the Kirkland-Thurman Interview Tapes. Dr. Kirkland was a Guest Scientist (Military Social Historian) at the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, DC. Dr. Kirkland served as one of the lead investigators for the 1980s evaluation of the human dimensions of the Army’s New Manning System (NMS). He was a member of a team of WRAIR social scientists that studied how newly designed Army units (called “COHORT,” referring to the way these company-sized units were organized, trained, and deployed) contributed to cohesion and readiness, as well as their impact on the well-being of soldiers, their families, and military communities. This research also addressed issues specific to the effect of COHORT on battalion rotation, battalion reconstitution, unit climate, and spouse adjustment. It included a comprehensive examination of the establishment of the Army’s first light infantry division at Fort Ord, California. Dr. Kirkland was one of the primary investigators of the light infantry division study.

Dr. Kirkland was introduced to General Thurman by Dr. David Marlowe, Chief of the Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR, during a COHORT research review meeting. It is not clear as to the extent of their subsequent contacts, though General Thurman had a keen interest in many of WRAIR’s research activities, including the study of the fielding of the Army’s Light Infantry Division at Fort Ord. At some subsequent date, and while General Thurman was undergoing cancer treatment at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, Maryland, General Thurman agreed to participate in a series of interviews with Dr. Kirkland. These interviews were intended to capture General Thurman’s perspectives on leadership through the lens of his career experiences as an Army Officer. The fact that both General Thurman and Dr. Kirkland shared a background as Field Artillery Officers enriched their relationship. Dr. Kirkland was a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and had served in several of the same assignments/locations as had General Thurman. Dr. Kirkland’s curriculum vita is located at the end of this Preface.

The existence of these 17 taped interviews was not generally known until immediately prior to Kirkland's death on February 22, 2000. In late 1999 Dr. Kirkland asked a former colleague at the Department of Military Psychiatry, Ms. Linette Sparacino, to be his Literary Executrix for his various research projects and unfinished writings, this project being one. As Literary Executrix, Ms. Sparacino was to make all final determinations regarding the content and disposition of Dr. Kirkland's unfinished research projects and unpublished writings. Ms. Sparacino, with the consent of the Kirkland Family, is making these interviews available as public documents with the intent that they will be useful for military scholars and others interested in various aspects of military leadership and military affairs.

III. Thurman Interviews (Audio and Digital Transcription).

A. *Interview Transcription Process/Accuracy.* In order to assure the user that the most accurate digital transcription of the original audio interviews has been provided, the digital transcription has been carefully compared to the original audio interview to confirm that the content accurately reflects each interview. In some cases, the user will observe an "auditor's note" entry within the digital transcription. The auditor's note is intended to provide additional information or context regarding a specific point in the interview. In other places there will just be parenthetical notes to explain an acronym used by Thurman to describe a process, system or piece of equipment or the complete name of an individual when it was not provided during the interview. In one case information contained within one of the various interviews was deleted from both the audio and digital interviews. Specifically, this case occurred after Thurman subjectively characterized an officer's performance. Following a brief pause, Thurman directed that his comment be deleted from all official records pertaining to this interview and that his comment was intended to be for non-attribution. In addition, there is one place where a discussion of Thurman's health was deleted.

B. *"Missing/Sequencing Interviews."* The user will note that there are interviews numbered "5" and "5A" as well as no interviews numbered "7" and "8." Because Kirkland died just weeks after mentioning the existence of these audio cassettes, it was not possible to discuss with him the numbering sequence he used. Although a thorough search was done to locate the two apparent missing interviews, they were not found. The sequencing of the interview topics are generally in chronological order following Thurman's assignments throughout his career,

C. *Interview Transcriptions Constitute Raw Research Data.* The information contained within these interviews should be viewed as "raw research data" as opposed to information contained in a structured, deliberate approach for the development of specific themes leading to identifiable conclusions or a definite call to action.

D. *Scope of Interview Content.* During the course of the initial interview (and in some subsequent interviews) Thurman asked Kirkland what he planned to do with the

interview information. Kirkland responded that he had not decided, but he believed that it was important to tell the story of the evolution of the Army's personnel program and policy changes that are a part of General Thurman's military career experience because it is an important story. Thurman agreed to continue the interviews under one condition: he did not want a biography that would be aggrandizing to Thurman himself. Agreeing with Kirkland, Thurman believed that describing the "human dimensionality" in the Army from the conclusion of World War II through the first Gulf War was a significant story with important implications for understanding the evolution of Army policies and personnel practices. With the goal of documenting the evolution, in what both Thurman and Kirkland referred to as the Army's "human dimensionality," Thurman agreed to these interviews. A total of 17 interview tapes were provided to Ms. Sparacino after Dr. Kirkland's death. Although the interviews appear to cover Thurman's complete military career, the organizing focus during all the interviews was Thurman's observations concerning broad personnel issues and their impact upon key topics like leadership, training, logistics and procurement. Not surprisingly, these conversations offer insight into how the Army's culture changed over the period of General Thurman's career.

E. Interview Structure and Using the Interview Data.

1. Using the Recorded Interviews. When the "user" listens to the audio interviews/reads the digital transcription, the user will note that topics are frequently returned to for further discussion either during the same interview or during a subsequent interview(s). This is due to either Kirkland, in reviewing his interview cassettes/notes, needing additional clarification on a topic or Thurman wanting to amplify a previous point. As a result, the same topic might be addressed in multiple interviews and the user cannot assume that a single tape includes all the relevant discussion regarding a specific topic.

2. Using the Digital Interview Transcription. When the original interviews were transcribed, the "order" or sequence of the topics was not always followed. Consequently, the content may not directly "flow" from one interview to the next. It should be noted that all 17 interview transcription files have been placed into a single digital file to facilitate searching these data. As a result, if a user has a specific topic, the user can conduct an electronic "Key Word Search" of the entire contents.

III. Acknowledgements. The audio and digital transcription of the "Thurman/Kirkland Interviews" and their subsequent on-line availability to the general public would not have occurred without the encouragement, assistance and support of many dedicated and concerned individuals:

- A. Kirkland Family: Emelyn Ewer Kirkland, his widow; Faris Russell Kirkland, Jr., his son; and his daughters, Emelyn Story K. Biddle and Victoria S. Ewer K. Carchidi.

- B. LTG (Ret.) Theodore G. Stroup, LTG (Ret.) Guy Swan III and LTG (Ret.) William H. Reno
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- D. Project Auditors:
 Linette R. Sparacino, MA; (US Civil Service, Ret.); Literary Executrix and Thurman/Kirkland Project Chair
 Ronald A. Sparacino, MA; LTC, (US Army Ret.)
 James A. Martin, Ph.D.; COL, (US Army Ret.)
 Glenda Y. Nogami-Streufert, Ph.D.; (US Civil Service, Ret.)

IV. Digital Interview Summaries. To provide the user a more complete perspective of the content within each interview, a complete summary of all the Kirkland-Thurman Interviews follows:

- A. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #1** are:
 - Initial thoughts/intent of “Thurman Interview Project (biography of Thurman vs. evolution of “human dimensionality” as perceived and shaped by Thurman during his four decades of military service); Thurman was not interested in the former and believed there was significant value in the latter
 - Thurman’s commissioning and attendance at two Officer Basic Courses (Ordnance and Field Artillery)
 - 11th Airborne duty as a lieutenant during a four and one-half year period including initial experiences in leadership, significance of standards, deployment to Lebanon, tour as a Honest John platoon leader, deploying to Europe and transitioning from the 11th to the 24th Division in Europe
- B. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #2** are:
 - “Snow birding” as Billeting Officer at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
 - Attending the Field Artillery Basic and Advance Courses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
 - Hawk Instructor at Fort Bliss, Texas and how this duty provided Thurman “personal confidence” in his ability to convince other people to accept his views and positions
 - Deputy I Corps G-2 Intelligence Advisor in Vietnam, 1962 and how ill-equipped he was to do this job
- C. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #3** are:

- Follow up discussions on experiences as a lieutenant in the 11th Airborne Division; how the DIVARTY trained, the nature and quality of the company grade officers and NCOs, discussion of company and field grade officers from World War II and Korea, and impact of how officers and enlisted members were promoted based on their service in Korea and corresponding impact on the Army
- Initial discussion of how soldiers were sent home from World War II based on a point system that later evolved into tour length personnel policies that were then adopted for Korea and Vietnam; and how the Army evolved/adopted an individual replacement personnel system in Korea and Vietnam
- Monthly 11th Airborne Division Parade and Pay Day Activities; “If you don’t pay the troops face to face, then obviously you don’t command them”
- As a Corps Artillery Group XO in Vietnam, Thurman participated in the Army’s “Infusion Program” (unit that trained and deployed together arrives in Vietnam and immediately has one-half of its soldiers replaced by soldiers who have been in-country so that entire unit does not rotate twelve months later)
- Preliminary discussion of the COHORT Program within the 7th Infantry Division
- Thurman assigned to West Point as a Cadet Activities Officer and learns key lesson of how to operate independently as a staff officer

D. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #4** are:

- Discussion of command and staff assignments vs. time-in-grade requirements for promotions
- How/why Thurman viewed his assignment as the Cadet Activities Officer at West Point as a career shaping, formative experience; learned to work independently, the necessity of “getting into the commander’s head and understanding his intent, and developing a high comfort level in working with very senior people
- Thurman assumes command of a composite battalion, 2nd of the 35th Field Artillery Battalion in Vietnam, undergoes one of first IG inspections of activities in Vietnam
- Thurman feels good about his Vietnam experiences and does not feel the malaise, morose, or frustration about the strategies many of his contemporaries feel

E. Major topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #5** are:

- “Setting standards are very important and builds confidence when you meet those standards”
- “If you do not set the standards, somebody else will set the standard below you and it may not be congruent with what you had in mind”

- Expansion of One-Station-Training materially helped the Chief of Staff, Gen. Abrams, to expand the Army from 13½ to 16 divisions
- Being the TRADOC Resource Manager for Gen. DePuy provided great insights into combat developments and activities of the Army Material Command and groomed him to become Director of Program, Analysis and Evaluation on the Army Staff (and a better VCSA when that occurred)
- “TRADOC serves to prepare senior Army leaders in a way the operating commands do not”
- The Army still has an unresolved issue in terms of commanders’ tour length in combat and how should they be replaced as a part of a command-tour length policy

F. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #5A** are:

- Reflections upon the Army War College as a student there; nature and philosophy of who should attend and what should be taught
- Observations on how the Army selects for the War College and the nature of senior/flag officer promotions
- Thurman again reiterates his even stronger belief that his biography is unimportant but a “learned piece of work on the Army’s people functions” is appropriate and significant; he then outlines the key chapters or parts of this story:
 - o Begin with VOLAR and the terrible tragedy that was Vietnam; how did we get the way we got in Vietnam (e.g., drugs, pot, “fragging,” etc.)
 - o How did we begin to correct that
 - o What was the mistake of VOLAR; what was the impact of going from the draft to VOLAR
 - o What role did OE (Organizational Effectiveness) play
 - o What was the disaster of the 1979 recruiting failure and the outcomes of this failure
 - o Renaissance in people quality; its short- and long-term impacts
 - o Renaissance in training quality; its short- and long-term impacts
- Impact of Gen. Rogers as Army Chief of Staff and his institutionalizing OE within the Army that led to the “after action critique” and subsequently the AAR, which forever changed the Army
- Tour length policy for Desert Storm was units/troops remain for the duration as opposed to some form of rotation
- “the commander always wants to be at the crucial event of the day”
- Building the Army’s POM (Program Objective Memorandum) in the Army Staff
- Army Staff PA&E experiences as a lieutenant colonel; how to downsize the Army after the Vietnam war; Thurman’s career shaping experiences in understanding how the Army Staff, the Secretariat, the OSD, and the Congress run, as well as excellent examples of leadership and management

G. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #6** are:

- Describes process used by Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor to draw down the Army post Vietnam from 18 active and 10 reserve divisions to 12 active and 6 reserve divisions
- How the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established and staffed for its first commander, Gen. DePuy
- Thurman selected for DIVARTY Command with the 82nd; command climate due to Gen. Kroesen; philosophy of command; 06-08 Letter; training with maneuver units and live fire; establishing standards as a DIVARTY Commander—all officers must become expert on the Gunner's Test
- Responsible for running the Pop Warner Football League on post and the lessons learned that he later generalizes in other venues, including an understanding of the "Army Family."
- "If you are competent, that gives you confidence."
- "So it's a business of not do as I say do, but do as I do. That's a principle that you want to try to infect other people in."

H. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #9** are:

- Circumstances/decisions describing how Thurman remained in the Army up through lieutenant colonel and command of an artillery battalion in combat
- Thurman reviews his "lessons learned" in watching senior Army leaders lead and manage; he sees how "One man with a vision can change the Army"; he notes that Gen. DePuy changes the Army through the power of his intellect because he didn't have the authority to change it (authority resided in the Chief of Staff); his examples of this dynamic were: Gen. DePuy changed the structure of the doctrine and combat development for the Army; Gen. Shoemaker established the CAPSTONE Program; Gen. Starry dramatically refined the Air/Land Battle Doctrine; Gen. DePuy and Gorman codified tasks, conditions and standards in manuals and ARTEPs and began the National Training Center
- Thurman describes his tasks and observations as the Army's PA&E and what he learns as the Army's Programmer; notes how various Secretaries of the Army and Chiefs of Staff, as well as the DoD senior leadership and congress lead/manage the Army enterprise
- Thurman outlines what he is initially confronted with upon assuming command of the Recruiting Command

I. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #10** are:

- Continuing discussions on assuming command of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)

- Major emphasis on the role of research, target groups and advertising in support of recruiting; discusses how this occurs
- Changes the character and nature of the recruiting force (NCOs brought into recruiting for a tour and then returned to their branch)
- Changes how to recruit; philosophy is changed from “accession mode” to “contract mode”; initiates the adjudication process, “Rule of 50,” mission box and use of management by objective techniques
- Initiates use of computer system that matches MOS that applicant wants with what he is qualified for while prioritizing with the needs of the Army
- Initiates use of a computer system to provide short video vignette for each MOS in the Army to remove the “mystery and potential deceit” in what the applicant will be doing in that MOS
- Initiates use of incentives to help persuade people to enlist into the Army like the Army College Fund that later becomes the new GI Bill

J. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #11** are:

- Role of motivation and sales in recruiting; awards system used within recruiting
- Thurman’s general award’s philosophy; instituted an awards system for all Department of the Army civilians
- Thurman assumes the Army’s DCSPER position and outlines his priorities as he begins:
 - o Ensure USAREC continues to have the priority and resources it needs to succeed
 - o Understand, and adjust accordingly, the major systems being used to manage officers and NCOs, particularly which affects the density of NCOs by MOS
 - o Organize the Army’s “family business” (intent of Gen. Myer, Chief of Staff)
 - o Develop, field, test (and probably institutionalize) the COHORT
 - o Develop and explain (market) the relationship of why high quality people were necessary for use in high quality weapon systems; later to become known as “MANPRINT”(Manpower and Personnel Integration)
 - o Ensure that each Career Management Field (CMF) from grade E-9 to E-1 was appropriately filled with the requisite talent; why weren’t the CMFs balanced?
 - o Reinvigorate the officer and NCO “leadership business”
 - o Ensure the (New) GI Bill is approved

K. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #12** are:

- Thurman states that Brookings Institute asserts that Soldiers recruited in 1978, ’79 and ’80 were incapable of handling the Army’s new equipment being/soon to be fielded (e.g., M-1 Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle,

Apache Helicopter) and leads him to initiate the Functional Manpower Analysis (later to be called the Functional Area Analysis when Thurman chairs as the VICE); MANPRINT is also a byproduct

- To solve the imbalance of NCO density/CMF, Thurman changes the E7, E8, and E9 centralized promotion system first and then changes the decentralized E5 and E6 promotion system
- NCO Promotion system changes significantly reduce imbalances by density and CMF; secondary and tertiary effects of NCO promotion changes include frequency of NCO rotation back to OCONUS decrease, NCO tour lengths in CONUS increase, NCO reenlistments increase, and NCO family morale increases
- To resolve the “NCO overages” in certain grades and MOS, NCOs in overage MOS and grade are allowed to reenlist into a shortage MOS and grade (Bear Program); manipulation of the Reenlistment Bonus Program also used to encourage NCOs to migrate into shortage MOS/grade
- Initiates Army Family Symposium to allow Army spouses to tell their issues directly to the Army Staff; from a macro level, this process serves to empower spouses and further invests them into the Army
- Beginning with Secretary Marsh’s “Year of Leadership”, a more structured leadership approach begins within the Army with a special focus on the NCO Corps (PLC, BNOC and ANOC)
- Various Army initiatives involving increasing small unit cohesion (e.g., cohesion research, recruiting small unit “packages” that remain together thru training to the first unit, assessing the proposition of the Army adopting a “regimental system”) are formed into one program – COHORT; experiments and further research begins using platoons, companies and battalions in the light divisions (e.g., 25th, 82nd and 9th, the 10th is later added)

L. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #13** are:

- Entire interview on Tape 13 resulted from Kirkland reviewing previous interviews and developing/asking Thurman for clarifications on topics earlier discussed:
 - o As the new DCSPER, Thurman discusses his oversight role for USAREC; ensures priorities and resources continue to flow, begins to import into DCSPER selected commanders/staff from USAREC “who have hands-on recruiting experience which substantially improves our capability to make things happen in the DA and OSD staff”; continues briefing and nurturing Congress
 - o Amplifies spouse and family issues; restates macro view of what was happening in the Army relative to spouse and families, details how the Army Family Symposium initiative began, was structured and conducted, significance of follow-up actions, and provides several examples

- Organizational Effectiveness (OE) further elaborated upon, origin with LTG Bernie Rogers as the DCSPER and further gains momentum when GEN. Rogers becomes FORCSOM Commander (and later as the Chief of Staff), the dynamic of OE empowers commanders/staff and subordinates to better communicate and becomes institutionalized via the “After Action Review,” key activity is within 30 days of assuming command/key staff position, off-site meeting is conducted with principle subordinates and develops an action plan designed to improve unit/staff performance, “OE mechanism” radiates out from how to improve unit/staff performance to improving spouse/family support/installation support, definition of the “Army Family” expanded to include, over time, civilian workforce, contracting workforce, and the Reserve Component
- Resistance within the Army of expanding COHORT from the light infantry to the mechanized infantry is questioned, converging inhibiting factors precluding COHORT expansion were the lack of infrastructure in OCONUS, because local commanders did not have ability to cross-level COHORT and non-COHORT units within a battalion, brigade and/or division, readiness reporting via the 220-1 Report would appear “different” for personnel and training thus creating problems, lastly, senior commanders resisted COHORT, Desert Storm was first time where small unit replacement was prepared for before deployment with Gen. Vuono (Chief of Staff) establishing 100 tank crews, 100 Bradley crews and 100 field artillery crews identified/prepared to be used as replacements, if needed
- More detailed discussions regarding specifics of how the MOS/grade imbalances were resolved using “manipulatable personnel tools” (e.g., adjusting reenlistment bonus levels, lowering promotion points for promotion to grade E5 and E6, specific guidance to NCO promotion boards for grades of E7, E8, and E9

M. Topics and significant issues perspectives included within **Interview Tape #14** are:

- Continuance of discussion on use of “tools” to straighten out the NCO MOS/grade imbalance
- Leadership development is revisited; Thurman outlines what he believes to be the Army’s Officer Leadership Model with its three phases: attend a school, gain a command, and evaluation of officer’s command performance via the OER with a determination of whether officer is selected for the next school/command, if not selected for school/command then relegated to staff work or deselected to remain in the Army; Thurman learns the “One-a-Month Brand” from DePuy and uses this leadership technique as the DCSPER, VICE, TRADOC Commander and Southern

Command Commander, provides several examples/illustrations of leadership techniques

- Leadership within a COHORT unit is different than the leadership required for a non-COHORT unit
- Gen. Wickham becomes Chief of Staff and Thurman becomes Vice with Secretary Marsh continuing as the Secretary; Marsh and Wickham decide to add four light infantry divisions to the Army's force structure, two for the Active Component and two for the National Guard
- Thurman institutes the Functional Area Analysis (FAA) process as the Vice to ensure that all the new weapons systems about to come on line, do so in a coordinated manner and their respective fielding process is integrated to assure neither delays nor embarrassment to the Army
- Thurman and Under Secretary James Ambrose direct and integrate the Army's Acquisition Process; coincides with his (Thurman's chairing of the FAAs)

N. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #15** are:

- Begins with brief discussion of Thurman's presentation of the All Volunteer Force at its 20th anniversary
- Thurman is updated, with discussion, on some additional research conducted by Kirkland regarding the infusion program in Vietnam that Thurman participated in
- Further discussion on the evolution of the professional NCO Corps; NCO schools/training transition over a fifteen year period, from a local installation effort reflecting local needs to a more structured, formalized centrally controlled activity reflecting Army needs, the Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)
- Thurman expands on his role in the Army's acquisition process as the Vice; discusses the recent acquisition reform and the unhealthy direction (from a service perspective) it appears to be going, "...imperfect reform"
- Expansion of the extensive data collected on units fighting various types of engagement at the NTC; how Thurman orchestrated a more qualitative analysis of this data to determine how commanders/units could be better trained and be prepared resulting in them being more successful in future NTC rotations, e.g., determine a "pattern analysis" of the top 10% of successful commanders at the NTC and integrate this data into a tactical commander's training course and a computer simulation (JANUS); should this data (pattern analysis, etc.) be accessed into traits or characteristics and passed to promotion boards for consideration for promotion, battalion command selection
- ARI has a study at the War College that can predict, with a high degree, who among those attending will eventually be selected to one, two and three star generals and who will not; can also identify ability to think strategically and train strategic leadership

O. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #16** are:

- Tape begins with discussions relating to his period as the Vice and the TRADOC Commander; describes the "...interlocking, widely divergent system of systems trying to ultimately to focus its way into a standard TO&Es," DOCMOD
- Thurman describes his SOUTHCOM tour; begins explaining two unrelated events that eventually merge/culminate in his not retiring as scheduled but being appointed to command SOUTHCOM; first event is his briefing the incoming Secretary of Defense Cheney with considerations for new Secretary (Thurman becomes known to Cheney); second event is the incumbent SOUTHCOM CINC begins to have "policy disputes" with the Joint staff, the DoD resulting in the commander's relief and Thurman appointment as the replacement CINC, SOUTHCOM; Thurman directed to review all plans and change accordingly or propose same for JCS approval
- Side B begins with Thurman continuing his discussion on issues associated with his experience, primarily the Commander of TRADOC, and then begins discussion of his role in the "Women in the Army" topic
- Thurman explains his trip to China observing their Army's use of the TPU 36 and 37 radars we trained them on; notes that their Army is provincially based/influenced; they were surprisingly current in our Army's doctrine
- He facilitates the development of the Tactical Commanders Battle Training Program (TCBTP)
- The "Gunners Badge Syndrome" is implemented throughout all the schools within TRADOC; provides examples within various schools and why this "syndrome" approach is important
- Emphasized leadership development while in TRADOC including publishing FM 25-100, "Training the Force"
- Initial discussion on the "Women in the Army" issue; begins with Gen. Westmorland's guidance, as Chief of Staff, to integrate women into West Point; Army begins more focused marketing on women during the recruiting process; as the PA&E, he begins to explore specific issues associated with large scale integration of women into the Army along with the increased resourcing needed to accomplish this integration; evaluates why upper mental category women would attrite faster; than the same mental category males within the training base and the associated resource costs; Army staff beginning to receive "blowback" from the field as to whether or not women could handle chores in the FTXs and CPXs as well as other field missions; Army begins to align female recruiting goals in certain mental category groups to reduce overall female attrition in the training base
- Secretary Marsh directs Thurman, as the Army's DCSPER, to draft a policy statement concerning the use of women in the Army consistent with the existing public laws and the spirit of what governs their use in the

Navy and Air Force; Thurman describes the three person group he establishes to accomplish this work and their methodology used to develop their research/policy

P. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #17** are:

- Thurman continues his discussion on Women in the Army; initially researched and used the Department of Labor (DOL) Work Classification Codes “because they stood up under the scrutiny of court challenge in describing the Army jobs” (from a strength requirement perspective); then TRADOC was tasked to evaluate all the tasks that soldiers had to do by MOS culminating in a strength requirement effort, expressed in pounds, to either push, pull, lift or lift with others. The MOSs were then grouped into one of five strength or exertion categories of work: very heavy, heavy, moderately heavy, light, and sedentary
- Army Research Institute, ARI, then researched, using incoming women recruits, how much strength they could gain during training to be able to predict whether or not the required strength could be achieved for a specific MOS
- Based on the research, the Army developed and recruiters (actually the Military Entrance Processing Command and not the Army) began using a machine to give a predictive test that required lifting, pulling or pushing strength level for the MOS selected
- This research then facilitated the Army policy statement that “...women will be excluded from infantry, armor, artillery and others that would bring you into a routine direct contact with the enemy.”
- Transitioning the combat area was then addressed with the establishment of the “Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC),” seven codes that associate the MOS in a specific unit and its probability of routinely closing with the enemy; codifying the DCPC was accomplished by modifying every TOE/MTOE to include the DCPC for every MOS in that specific TOE/MTOE document
- Secretary Marsh approved this policy and the Army implemented it in 1982
- The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) did not totally support this policy resulting in its review in 1988; the subsequent new policy embraced “...some modification of the assignment game” but essentially stuck with the rules of the DCPC and female exclusion from the front lines of the battlefield
- At the end of both the Panama invasion and the end of the Gulf War, the administration conducted a Presidential Commission on the “Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces”; Thurman served on this commission and indicates that there were seventeen policy issues identified that remain unresolved
- The subject of “infusion” again discussed as an example of the Army’s preoccupation with taking a short range solution as opposed to accepting

the inherent risks and adopting more long solutions (as Thurman did throughout his career); people need to be trained to take a long range approach...the Army War College could but does not; discussed the ARSTAFF in terms of long vs. short range view/activity

- Reviews the renaissance of the 1980s brought about by the success of the All Volunteer Force and how it forced treating people with dignity as opposed to being a commodity
- Briefly discusses the readiness system and the profile system used by the Army
- Uses examples of the new Mobile Subscriber Equipment and the Patriot Missile systems outlining the challenges of the Army's (DoD's) procurement process

Q. Topics and significant issues/perspectives included within **Interview Tape #18** are:

- Thurman continues his discussion regarding the activities leading up to his nomination to be the new CINC, SOUTHCOM and the subsequent conflict in Panama
- Assumes position of CINC and two days later alerts the C, JCS (Powell) of a potential coup; after various delays, coup occurs and Noriega prevails
- American Press lambasts Bush Administration for not doing more to discredit/remove Noriega; Thurman back briefs Bush/Administration Officials on coup
- Thurman develops his priorities for his CINC responsibilities, responds to JCS in terms of his assessment and what he needs and assessment to OSD for providing anti-drug program support to Central American US Ambassadors
- Thurman obtains OSD approval to return all dependents from Panama (even though Service Chiefs did not agree); dependents begin departing country
- Thurman gives guidance to change Contingency Plan for Panama and then rehearses portions of it; continuous rehearsals also serves as a deception plan for the Panamanians
- On 16 December, 1989, 1Lt. Paz, USMC, is killed by Panamanian Defense Forces thereby initiating Operation Just Cause on 20 December 1989
- From a personnel policy perspective, Thurman highlights SOUTHCOM experiences: superior quality of the force is demonstrated; 7th ID participation and performance demonstrates the validity of the "light infantry division concept"; superior discipline of the force is demonstrated during Operation Just Cause

VI. Dr. Faris R. Kirkland's Curriculum Vitae:

**FARIS RUSSELL KIRKLAND, Ph.D., Lt. Col., USA
Ret.**

January 15, 1932–February 22, 2000

EXPERIENCE

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Department of Military Psychiatry, Research
Military Social Historian/foundation affiliated appointment (1986-93); Guest
Scientist (1993-96)
Bryn Mawr College, Dept. of History--Visiting Lecturer (1985).
Valley Forge Historical Society--Executive Director (1982-83).
University City Science Center--Senior Research Associate (1974-76); Director, Social
Science Research Group (1977-80); Senior Scientist (1988-93)
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Military Science--Associate Professor
(1968-73); Chairman (1972-73); Department of History--Lecturer (1971-72).
United States Army--Artillery Unit Commander, Nuclear Effects Engineer, Tactics
Instructor, and Operations Staff Officer (1953-73).

EDUCATION

Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1982, History.
MA. University of Pennsylvania, 1970, History.
Universities of Maryland, Oklahoma, Texas, 1959-65. 14 courses.
AB. Princeton University, 1953. Psychology.

HONORS

Military: Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Medal, Army
Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters.
Research: Department of the Army Decoration for Distinguished Civilian Service (1990);
National Research Council Senior Associate (1986-88); Best Article of the Year, Air
University Review (1985).
Academic: Cum Laude, Sigma Xi, Princeton University (1953); Academic Medallion,
University of Maryland (1963).
Teaching: Finalist for Christian R. and Mary F. Lindback Award for Distinguished
Teaching, University of Pennsylvania (1972, 1973).

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Council Member, Friends of the University of Pennsylvania Library.
Associate Editor, *Armed Forces and Society*
Member, Editorial Board, *European Studies Journal*

PUBLICATIONS

63. F.R. Kirkland. Honor, combat ethics, and military culture. In: Beam TE, Hartle AE, Pellegrino ED, Sparacino LR, eds. *Military Medical Ethics*, Vol 1. In: *Textbook of Military Medicine*. Washington, DC: Office of The Surgeon General, US Department of the Army and Borden Institute; 2001: Chap 6. In press.
62. F.R. Kirkland, "Preface" in J. P. Hawkins, *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Army Communities of Cold War Germany*. Westport, CT. Praeger Press, 2001.
61. F.R. Kirkland, "Cultural Dynamics of Civic Action in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, 1967--1968", *Armed Forces & Society* **26**, 4, (Summer 2000) 547-560.
60. F.R. Kirkland, (contributor: Psychiatry, Military, pp 573-574; Substance Abuse, pp 699-700; Veterans: Vietnam War, pp 753-754) *Oxford Companion to American Military History*. ed, John W. Chambers II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999
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57. F.R. Kirkland, "Leadership Doctrine: 1778-1995," *Military Review*, **78**, 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) 30-34.
56. F.R. Kirkland, "Confronting Psychological Trauma," *Military Review*, **78**, 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) 47-49
55. F.R. Kirkland, "The Attack on Cap Mui Lai, July 1968," *The Journal Of Military History*, **61**, 4 (Oct. 1997) 735-760.
54. F.R. Kirkland, "Self-Care, Psychological Integrity, and *Auftragstaktik*." Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, National Defense University, January 31, 1997. <http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE97/Kirkland97.htm>. (also as "*Auftragstaktik*" at <http://147.71.210.21/summer98/leadersh.htm> Air Defense Artillery Online, Fort Bliss, TX) (both web-sites verified 9 June 2000)

53. F.R. Kirkland, "Preface" in J.A. Martin, L.R. Sparacino, & G.L. Belenky, eds., The Gulf War and Mental Health Services: A Comprehensive Guide (New York: Greenwood, 1996). xix-xxxi.
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51. F.R. Kirkland, R.R. Halverson & P.D. Bleise "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," Parameters, **26**, 2 (Summer 1996) 79-91.
50. F.R. Kirkland, "Can Soldiers Keep Peace? A Study of the Recent History of the Psychological Dimensions of the U. S. Army" Journal of Psychohistory, **23**, 4 (Spring 1996) 427-437.
49. F.R. Kirkland, M.G. Ender, R.K. Gifford, K.M. Wright, & D.H. Marlowe, "The Human Dimension in Force Projection: Discipline Under Fire," Military Review, **76**, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1996) 57-64.
48. F.R. Kirkland, "Soldiers and Marines at Chosin Reservoir: Criteria for Assignment to Combat Command," Armed Forces and Society, **22**, 2 (Winter 1996) 257-274.
47. F.R. Kirkland, "Post-Combat Reentry" in F.D. Jones, L.R. Sparacino, V.L. Wilcox, & J.M. Rothberg, eds., War Psychiatry. Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I, Vol. 6, (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, US Dept. of the Army, and Borden Institute, 1995) 291-317
46. F.R. Kirkland & M.A. Jackson, "Psychiatric Support for Commanders" in F.D. Jones, L.R. Sparacino, V.L. Wilcox, & J.M. Rothberg, eds., Military Psychiatry: Preparing in Peace for War. Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I, Vol. 7, (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, US Dept. of the Army, and Borden Institute, 1994) 171-192.
45. F.R. Kirkland, P.T. Bartone & D.H. Marlowe, "Commanders' Priorities and Psychological Readiness," Armed Forces and Society, **19**, 4 (Summer 1993) 579-598.
44. F.R. Kirkland, "French Air Strength in 1940," Air Power History, **40**, 1 (February 1993) 22-34.
43. F.R. Kirkland, "Thor: A Case Study in Multi-Service Coordination," Field Artillery, (February, 1993) 11-15.
42. R. Schneider & F.R. Kirkland, "Training Lieutenants," Military Review, **72**, 5 (May 1992) 10-21.

41. F.R. Kirkland, "Governmental Policy and Combat Effectiveness: France 1920-1940," Armed Forces and Society, **18**, 2 (Winter 1992) 175-91.
40. F.R. Kirkland, "Childhood, Psychopathology, and the Gulf War," Journal of Psychohistory, **19**, 1 (Summer 1991) 57-65.
39. P.T. Bartone & F.R. Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units" in R. Gal & A.D. Manglesdorff, eds., Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1991) 393-409.
38. J. Boulegue, "'Feminization' and the French Military: An Anthropological Approach," tr. F.R. Kirkland, Armed Forces and Society, **17** 3 (Spring 1991) 343-362.
37. F.R. Kirkland, "Leadership Policy and Leadership Practice: Two Centuries of Foot-Shooting in the United States Army," Journal of Psychohistory, **18**, 3 (Winter 1991) 317-329.
36. F.R. Kirkland, "Combat Leadership Styles: Empowerment versus Authoritarianism," Parameters, **20**, 4 (December 1990) 61-72.
35. F.R. Kirkland, "The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective," Parameters, **20**, 3 (September 1990) 50-62.
34. P. Katz & F.R. Kirkland, "Violence and Social Structure on Mental Hospital Wards," Psychiatry, **53**, 3 (August 1990) 262-277.
33. F.R. Kirkland, "Assessing COHORT," Army, **40**, 5 (May 1990) 44-50.
32. N. Harrison, F.R. Kirkland, & J. Rothberg, "Mission, Stress, and Leadership in the DISCOM," The Army Logistician, (May-June 1990) 37-41. (also DTIC ADA 292386).
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28. F.R. Kirkland, "European Social Traditions and Military Cohesion," Proceedings of the Thirteenth European Studies Conference (Cedar Falls, IA: University of Northern Iowa, 1988) 148-158.
27. F.R. Kirkland, "Affiliation, Double Binds, and 'The Boys In the Barracks'", Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology, **10**, 1 (Winter 1987) 45-52.
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19. F.R. Kirkland, J. Teitelbaum "Study of the Human Dimensions of the 7th Light Infantry Division, Appendix E," in D.H. Marlowe, ed. New Manning System Field Evaluation, Technical Report No. 2 (Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, March, 1986). (also DTIC ADA 262222).
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16. F.R. Kirkland, "Education, Cultural Values, and the French Army between the World Wars," European Studies Journal, 2, 2 (Fall 1985) 22-31.
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12. F.R. Kirkland & J. Good, Evaluation of the ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) Scholarship Recipient Selection System (ARI Research Note RN 83-30). (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1983). (also DTIC ADA 135 834).
11. J.H. Stiehm, F.R. Kirkland, & R.C. Rice, "Courses on Women in the Military" in J.H. Stiehm, ed., "Women and Men's Wars," special issue of Womens' Studies International Forum, 5, 3/4 1982) 335-340.
10. F.R. Kirkland, The French officer Corps and the Fall of France, 1920-1940 (Ph.D. dissertation). (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1982. Published University of Pennsylvania 1983).
9. F. R. Kirkland & M.C. Kenty, Context Evaluation of the Child Advocacy Unit of the Philadelphia Defender's Association. (Philadelphia, PA: University City Science Center, 1980).
8. J. Good, F.R. Kirkland, Attitudes Toward Selected Job Characteristics in a Working Population with Cross-Sample Analyses for a College Sample. (Philadelphia, PA: University City Science Center, 1979). (also DTIC ADA 072412).
7. J. Good, F.R. Kirkland, & G.R. Grissom, Working Relationships between Men and Women: Effects of Sex and Hierarchical Position on Perceptions of Self and Others in a Work Setting. (Philadelphia, PA: University City Science Center, 1979). (also DTIC ADA 072413).

6. J. Good & F.R. Kirkland, Family and Career Values: Sex Differences in a Working Population. (Philadelphia: University City Science Center, 1979). (also DTIC ADA 072411).
5. F.R. Kirkland, J. Good, & H.R. Day, More Effective Utilization of Women in the All-Volunteer Navy, (Philadelphia, PA: University City Science Center, 1979). (also DTIC ADA 073056).
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3. F.R. Kirkland, "Military Education in High Schools: An Exploration of Fears and Beliefs" in M.K. Roper & J.S. Clark, eds., Beyond War. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1976) 400-412.
2. F.R. Kirkland & P.L. McGrew, A Culture Assimilator for Interaction with Persons of Different Cultural Backgrounds (Doc. CSD #74 10). 8 Vols. (Philadelphia, PA: University City Science Center, 1975).
1. F.R. Kirkland, Commander's Handbook for Defense Against Radiation (Special Text 44-191) (Fort Bliss, TX: U.S. Army Air Defense School, 1960).

GRANTS AND RESEARCH CONTRACTS

Leadership Behavior and Post-Combat Psychological Adjustment: An Historical Analysis of Human Dimensions in operations Desert Storm and Just Cause. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (1991-93). \$149,724. Principal Investigator.

Interpretation of Interviews with Veterans of the Invasion of Panama, December 1989. U. S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (1990-91). \$24,291. Principal Investigator.

History of Human Relations in the U.S. Army. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (1988-90). \$106,820. Principal Investigator.

The American Soldier in the All-Volunteer Force in the 1980s. U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (1988) \$22,000. Principal Investigator.

Behavioral Correlates of Survey Research. National Academy of Sciences (1985-88). \$82,350. Principal Investigator.

Operating Grant for the Valley Forge Museum. Institute of Museum Services, U.S. Dept. of Education (1983-84). \$17,740. Project Director.

Evaluation of the Philadelphia Child Advocacy Unit.' U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (1979-80). \$74,832. Project Director.

Assessment of Training for the Aging Network in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania Dept. of Aging (1979). \$29,000. Principal Investigator.

Evaluation of the HUD National Communication Plan. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (1978-79). \$30,911. Project Director.

U.S. Army Reserve Retention. U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (1977-79). \$59,901. Principal Investigator.

More Effective Utilization of Women in the All-Volunteer Navy. Office of Naval Research (1977-79). \$44,996. Principal Investigator.

Army ROTC Four-Year Scholarship Recipient Selection Program Evaluation. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (1976-7). \$79,601. Principal Investigator.

Military Education in High Schools: An Exploration of Fears and Beliefs. Public Committee for the Humanities in Pennsylvania and the University Museum (1975). \$9,000. Project Director.

The Origins of Violence, a Film Festival in the University Museum Bicentennial Program "War or Peace 1976." National Endowment for the Humanities (1974). \$6,000. Project Director.