THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920:
An Essay on Sources (authored by John Slonaker, MHI Staff Member, in 1990)

I. INTRODUCTION

In the history of civil-military relations, a tension has existed between the concepts of the professional army and citizen army.* The transformation from professional to citizen army can be viewed as either a corrective or a surrender to the military impulse within the general society. If the former: When standing professional armies begin to drain a nation's wealth and endanger its democratic principles, the genius of citizen armies is rediscovered. If the latter: After a society has been sufficiently militarized, say, by a war and its demobilized soldiery, it is willing to spread responsibility for defense throughout the citizenry.

After the Vietnam War, the U.S. devised the total force concept and has increasingly placed reliance on its Reserve and National Guard capabilities in the years that have followed. A similar phenomenon occurred following the demobilization of the A.E.F. in 1919, at a time when Western societies were every bit as tired of wars and armies (or as militarized) as America was after the Vietnam War. The National Defense Act of 1920 reflects those anxieties.

The history of the Act (henceforth referred to as NDA) extends from 1912, when 42-year old Captain John McAuley Palmer authored the "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" for Secretary of War Henry Stimson, to 1944, when now-General Palmer again expressed his thoughts on the citizen army

* A note on definition. In one sense "citizen army" is an oxymoron. A definition of "citizen" in the Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 edition, is "a civilian as distinguished from a soldier." In the sense in which "citizen" is used in this paper, "citizen soldiers" are defined as National Guardsmen or Army Reservists. See A Dictionary of Soldier Talk by John Elting and others (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984).

in War Department Circular 347. The focal point of these 33 years, of course, is the debate and passage of the Act in 1920, but it is important to recognize such other significant events as the passage of the original National Defense Act of 1916 and post-1920 amendments (especially 1933). It is important, too, to trace the size and structure of the prewar, Great War and postwar Army; the course of the universal military training debate; the relationships of the Regular Army, Organized Reserves and National Guard in this period; and the size of military budgets, year by year.

The National Defense Act of 1920, which was in name only an amendment to the 1916 Act, was a successful piece of legislation not so much because it strengthened the citizen army concept but because
it managed to serve the purposes of a myriad of constitu-encies. Its significance, thus, is largely in the eye of the beholder.
The Regular Army spoke of having received a clear mandate for administrative control of a tripartite Army of the United States, recognition of the central role of the General Staff, and a logical promotion scheme. The National Guard saw its importance, as displayed in the recent war, recognized with representation on the General Staff and a semblance of command of its own fate in the Militia Bureau. The militarists won a sizable army (not the one-half million they sought and only on paper) and citizen military training. Anti-militarists saw their opposition to universal military training vindicated and creation of a more political War Council. Lastly, in establishment of a more powerful Assistant Secretary of War, businessmen believed that in procurement matters they had won a friendlier ear than they had found with the military officers of the General Staff during the war.

This essay is a review of the literature on NDA, its historical background and its legacy. Also, some of the major historical themes or questions generated by the NDA debate are bibliographically reviewed.

A procedural note: Since the sections of books that cover the Act are cited in the attached bibliography, specific page references are not provided in this essay, unless the reference follows a direct quote.

II. PRECURSOR DOCUMENTS OF NDA

Henry Stimson encouraged reorganization of the Army in 1912, and Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, never unwilling to ruffle feathers, accommodated him by recruiting Capt. John McAuley Palmer to draft a Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States. (53) It recognized the important roles of organized and unorganized militia, spoke of the historical basis of the citizen army, described a Regular Army that would have distinctively different roles at home and abroad, and envisioned a politically responsive war council on top and a soldier force of volunteers as a foundation. Here were the roots of Palmer's postwar NDA hearing testimony and the final Act itself.

That same year Stimson solicited articles from other officers, who called for a more intelligent policy to deal with a truly national Army, that is, one that could serve as a tool of great geopolitical purposes, rather than a mere constabulary. (52) In these articles the spectre of the German Army first appears in NDA history. Hunter Liggett, in addressing the Army's alienation from the American people, saw in Germany (and Great Britain) brotherhood and unity where others saw pervasive militarism. Because of Germany's large military establishment, according to Liggett, every family had "a heart interest in the army -- a father, a husband, a son, or a brother." (p. 23). The last appearance of the German Army in the NDA debate (in Circular 347) (64) would be something quite different.

The Army War College weighed in with a Statement of a Proper Military Policy in 1915 (published in 1916). (54) Palmer's recognition of the supreme importance of militia did not appear in this collection of studies. The War College solicited, instead, a strengthened Regular Army supported by a federal Organized Militia, which itself would be dissociated from the National Guard, a force ignored by the War College.
The father of the Preparedness Movement of the years immediately preceding America's entry into the Great War was Leonard Wood. As a Progressive, he wished to instill order and reason in the turbulence of an American society heavily populated with immigrants. Numerous pamphlets, articles and books are found in the Military History Institute (hereafter referred to as MHI) on efforts in these years to apply the Progressive reform impulse to both the form and the content of America's military. Writers and speakers offered ideas for reorganizing the Army and revitalizing the enfeebled citizenry. Huidekoper is but one example. The Clifford study focuses on the Plattsburg Training Camp aspect of the movement. A broader brush is applied by Pearlman.

Congress reflected the anxieties of the period and passed the National Defense Act of 1916, establishing a strong relationship between the Regular Army and National Guard that exists to this day. (The National Guard had been "earning its stripes" nationwide as the disciplinarian of labor.) By removing restrictions on the federalized use of the Guard, the 1916 Act adroitly avoided the recommendations of Secretary of War Linley Garrison (and the Army War College), who had sought a large separate "continental army" reserve. The reorganization role of Secretary of War Newton Baker, who had replaced Garrison in 1916, is covered by Frederick Palmer.

Great War mobilization led to 1916-1919 revisions to the Act. They can be traced in published compilations by the War Department and Congress, with useful tables. In Washington during the war the General Staff strengthened its grip on the irerepressible War Department bureaus, while Congressmen observed difficulties in the procurement process that were debated in postwar NDA hearings. Meanwhile, in Europe, Palmer was assigned to a brigade command in the federalized 29th National Guard Division and learned in practice the validity of his theory -- the citizen army could serve as a main defense force. A similar pride about National Guard service in the A.E.F. was displayed by politicians like Henry Allen. Palmer would call upon that enthusiasm in Congress to overcome War Department resistance.

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NDA

As the massive Army demobilized rapidly in 1919, new defense policies were urgently needed to rationally restructure and reduce the size of the peacetime Army. Chief of Staff Peyton March won Secretary Baker's approval of a bill that represented the first volley fired in the NDA tug-of-no-more-war. Seriously misjudging public opinion (or ignoring it), March felt this was a "golden moment" to strike for universal conscription. He also advocated a strong General Staff (thus strengthening his own Chief of Staff position) at the expense of bureau independence. Bureau opposition is reviewed in Nelson, while March's case is presented in the War Department Annual Report of 1919 and in his Nation at War. Historians who have looked at the bill are Coffin and Hammond.

Three major counter proposals were introduced in Congress. Briefly, the four bills can be summarized as follows:

1. Baker/March - sought a larger Regular Army (one-half million men) and universal military training (henceforth referred to as UMT).

2. Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen and the National Guard - sought to remove the National Guard from the Chief of Staff's control and keep a citizen army.
3. Congressman Julius Kahn - no UMT; keep the National Guard as it was in 1916; set the Regular Army strength at 300,000.

4. Senator James Wadsworth and Colonel Palmer - a huge citizen army under federal control, a small Regular Army, and volunteer military camps; as a compromise with the Democrats the idea of UMT was dropped. (9)

The legislative history of these bills is most thoroughly presented in Dickinson and Lee (13, 33), but summaries and commentary on the debate appear in House, Boylan, Coffman and Colby. House observes that March was defeated because of pent-up dislike of Regular Army officers (to whom the male public had been exposed during the war); because of its projected costs; and because of anti-militarism. Boylan notes that the Army and Congress disagreed on new policies, the former seeking central-ization and the latter, local control of the National Guard and the nearly autonomous bureaus. And, too, even within the Army as well as within Congress, there were strong currents of disagree-ment. (5) Coffman, making the best of March's defeat, concludes the Chief of Staff and Palmer both lost out to anti-militarism, reasons of economy and the urge toward "normalcy." (8) Finally, Colby highlights the tension between states' rights or local control and centralization or federalization. (9) The latter is also described as neo-Hamiltonianism by Huntington and, more importantly for this essay, Uptonianism by Palmer. (27, 42) Since Wadsworth and Palmer were forced to surrender on UMT, Colby believes it is not accurate to view the final NDA as a Wadsworth victory. (9) Derthick, too, in her National Guard study emphasizes Wadsworth's loss of UMT to the states' rights advocates of the American heartland. (12)

The debate about federal use of the National Guard focused on a Constitutional question -- whether the Guard is legitimzed by the militia clause or the army clause. In other words, whether the Guard should be primarily a state or national force and serve the other polity secondarily. (42, 9)

The intransigence of the problem about the Guard's role, the failure to liberate it from the militia clause because of its political power, had been and continued to be responsible for the emphasis on a second, more federal reserve, at this time known as the Organized Reserves. (42)

The most widely used memoir on the legislative history of the NDA is Palmer's America in Arms, which is essentially the story of the creation of the Wadsworth bill, with the implication that NDA was simply Wadsworth sans UMT. (42) He describes how he was recruited for bill drafting after providing testimony:

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National Defense Act of 1920
As I was leaving the Capitol after my testimony, a messenger overtook me and informed me that Senator Wadsworth wanted to see me. He received me in his private office where, as nearly as I can remember his words, he said: "Colonel Palmer, a very remarkable thing has happened. Night before last, the subcommittee met at my house where we finally decided to reject the War Department bill. We then decided to write a bill of our own. We wrote down a few paragraphs outlining what we considered to be the basis of a sound military organization for the United States. And there we stopped. We didn't know how to expand these principles into a complete bill, and we didn't think we were likely to get much help from the War Department. And now, to our amazement, you have been before us two afternoons and have given us all the details of our own plan. The committee has therefore instructed me unanimously, to write to the Secretary of War to ask for your assignment as our military advisor. We are going to write down our own bill, and we want you to help us." A few days later the Secretary of War assigned me to special duty with the Senate Military Committee..." (pp. 168-169)

The permutations of the Wadsworth bill (S.3792) are excellently revealed in a bound volume of Senate (and some House) bill amendments on file in MHI. (55)

Hoping to influence the legislative process (and not, perhaps, recognizing the anti-Uptonian casts of the minds so assigned), the War Department sent to the House and Senate military affairs committees four officers, who were to assist in drafting the reorganization bills. Palmer and John Gulick were sent to the Senate and Thomas Spaulding and Thomas Hammond to the House. (42)

As democracy in action, the hearings are notable for the breadth of opinion expressed on the future role of the military in the U.S. (56, 59, 60) The testimony reflects currents running through society that the military establishment often ignored. Those testifying to the House between September 3, 1919, and February 5, 1920, included Secretary Baker, General March, Assistant Secretary Benedict Crowell, the president of the Universal Military Training League, War Department bureau chiefs, Congressmen, members of the General Staff, the Training Camp Association, enlisted men seeking a pay increase, the American Legion, educators, pastors, the Society of American Indians, and Quakers and Brethren.

Four bills were before the House Committee: H.R. 8287 to reorganize the Army; H.R. 8068 on UMT; H.R. 7925 on creation of a Department of Aeronautics; and H.R. 8870 on making "more effective provision for the national defense." A fifth bill, H.R. 9204 on increasing military pay, was also addressed.

Meeting between August 7 and December 17, 1919, and again in early 1920, the Senate Committee heard testimony on UMT (S. 2691), creation of a Department of Aeronautics (S. 2693), and two bills on reorganization of the Army (S. 2715 and S. 3792).
IV. CONTENTS OF NDA

Although devised as an amendment to the 1916 Act, NDA was actually a new law. Passed on June 4, 1920, the last half (Chapters II and III) of the sixty-page NDA concerns the Articles of War and military justice system and is not covered in this discussion. Complete editions are found in Acts and Resolutions and War Department Bulletin No. 25, dated June 9, 1920. (63)

Chapter I on Army organization has sections on the over-arching Army of the United States and its Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves components. The strength and organization of officer, warrant officer and enlisted ranks, the General Staff, and various departments and bureaus are outlined, as are officer promotions and soldier enlistments. The chapter concludes with sections on the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, training camps, the enlisted reserve (never funded beyond tokenism), and federalization of the National Guard.

The provisions are summarized by many, including Bernardo, Hewes, House, Spaulding, and the U.S. Infantry Association (4, 22, 25, 51). Among the features: the Army within the continental U.S. would be organized into tactical (rather than purely geographical) corps areas, with at least one National Guard or Organized Reserves division assigned to each. Total active Army enlisted strength would not exceed 280,000 (raised through volunteer enlistments) and 17,000- plus officers. As much of the National Guard and Organized Reserves lineage would be perpetuated as possible. A War Council would be created, consisting of the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary, Chief of Staff, and General of the Army, the latter two positions becoming one when General Pershing ascended to Chief of Staff in July 1921. The General Staff, its size fixed by law, was given responsibility for national defense planning, while the Assistant Secretary of War assumed procurement responsibility. Several wartime branches received official recognition -- Air Service, Chemical Warfare Service, Finance, Medical Administration. [Weigley points out that one branch lost out. The Tank Corps was dissolved into the Infantry, encouraging a restricted view of its utility. (75)] Training of reserves would be accomplished via the ROTC and civilian military training camps.

The Regular Army retained vital functions: garrisoning strategic bases abroad, maintaining effective combat divisions for contingencies, and training reserves at corps centers around the country. (42)

To adapt to the new constraints and missions, officers in the combat arms pushed for branch-level reorganization in their own periodicals, such as Cavalry Journal and Field Artillery Journal. In the latter, "large" and "small" division reorganization scenarios were offered. (6, 16)

There was a consolidating impulse in NDA -- a unified officer promotion list, rather than the separate lists in each branch, which had led to internecine politicking. On this subject, see the Thomas Spaulding testimony in the House hearings and the Cavalry Journal, (October 1920. (56, 6) Too, within the enlisted ranks grades were standardized in the wake of NDA. (10)

In the immediate afterglow of the Act, Regular Army officers were enthusiastic. See, for example, Boylan and the Cavalry Journal, October 1920, page 303 ("...for the first time in its history, the army has been placed upon a sound organizational basis.") and the Infantry Journal, July 1920, page 71 ("The Army has cause to congratulate itself..."). (5, 6, 28)
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Each constituency measured its gains and losses. The National Guard archived control of the Militia Bureau, but remained wary of the Organized Reserves. (12) To many in the Regular Army, the Act could not succeed since Congress had rejected compulsory service and a large increase in force size and funding, but at least NDA provided a "sounder basis for wartime mobilization than existed in 1917." (36, p. 365) The plan's most obvious deficiency was simple. It was just that -- a plan. In reality, it had no men. (37) The structure rested on a trained citizenry, but failed to provide for such a body, according to Pogue. (49) To another commentator, the NDA "enacted the rhetoric of greater civilian participation and preparedness without providing the means." (19)

In summary, the NDA was a compromise in several directions. The citizen army role was recognized, but, lacking the impetus of mandatory service and follow-up appropriations sufficient to support a 280,000-man force, the bones were quite visible through the meager flesh. Yet to William Ganoe, "This legislation was by all odds the greatest provision for prolonging peace and the efficient control of war ever enacted by the Congress. It took into account lessons of the recent struggle and suited itself to the genius of our people." (18, p. 485)

V. LEGACY OF NDA

Commentary on the interwar (and later) legacy of the NDA can be categorized as follows:

1. The size of the Army and its funding remained far below the numbers envisioned by the Act's drafters
2. and the lack of UMT robbed it of its heart,
3. yet the citizen army idea or skeleton survived and enabled the U.S. to mobilize quickly in World War II.
4. The failure of NDA to achieve a more solid fulfillment was caused by the opposition of businessmen, "states' righters" and anti-militarists. Countering their influence, advocating a strong federal military force, were anti-communists, prewar-like preparedness groups, and a nascent military-industrial complex.

Addressing these four themes in turn:

1. Congress failed to fund for a strength of 280,000. Within two years it had gutted the Act "without hindrance of the mass of the people," as Ganoe phrased it. (18, p. 489) Army authorized strength fell throughout most of the 1920's, never approaching 280,000 or the General Staff's plan for a total of six Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves divisions in each corps area. By 1922, the authorized enlisted strength was down to 125,000. (42) That same year a progress report on the Army that had emerged from NDA was published by the U.S. Infantry Association, addressing the issues of size of the Regular Army officer force and costs of maintaining the Army. (61) Another portrait of the Army's size, structure and costs in the post-NDA years is available at MHI -- a collection of about 300 statistical reports. (70)
2. The best account of the Congressional debate on UMT is in Mooney. By the end of 1920, he reports that that issue was "about the deadest in American politics." (38, p. 656) It was in the heartland that UMT was defeated, says Derthick. (12)
In the NDA debate Regular Army officers had offered the argument that UMT could be used to Americanize aliens (56, Churchill testimony) and in the postwar years the value of using Regular Army trainers to instill the nation's values continued to be asserted. (18) In fact, a special conference on citizenship training was called by Secretary of War Weeks in 1922 and Army Training Manuals of the 1920's in MHI include a heavy dose of citizenship indoctrination. (62,65)

Another aspect of adjusting the Army and the society to one another in a world without UMT involved salesmanship. F. S. Laurence in the Infantry Journal tried to interest the Army in selling itself to the populace. (28)

3. Though highly skeletonized, NDA was valuable as a scheme for future expansion in wartime when a draft would be politically acceptable. (15) Koisten is more realistic about interwar NDA than the majority who have accepted the Regular Army's complaints about underfunding. He says the mobilization plans were economically realistic for a change. (30)

4. The opposition to a strong, centralized military force came from businessmen concerned about taxes and debt; from isolationists in the central U.S. who looked askance at the profits of munitions manufacturers; from those who remembered the effectiveness of the National Guard in the A.E.F.; from anti-militarists, including pacifists; and especially from a citizenry that was generally apathetic to the issues raised. (19, 27, 73) Unsuccessfully countering those forces were organizations that favored a strong federal military out of fear of international communism or a continuing fascination with preparedness and citizen training camps. For example, the above-mentioned U.S. Infantry Association argued the "by-product" benefits of preparedness training. (61, 73)

Reflecting its all-things-to-all-people character, NDA has been judged as:

1. Ineffective, gutted, especially without UMT. (4, 42)

2. Effective, providing a sound basis for future mobilization, a bare-bone skeleton, the essentials of the Army that Marshall would inherit in 1939. (36, 42, 49)

3. Anti-military. (8, 12, 19, 27)

4. Militaristic. (3, 14)

5. Victory for states' righters, bureau fragmenters and the National Guard. (19, 22, 23)

6. Victory for federalization, even though the centralizing tendency of Baker was defeated. NDA represented the final victory of Root reformers who had sought federalization of the citizen army. (14, 15) [Others emphasize the 1933 amendment as the significant federalizing date, bringing the National Guard into the federal reserve, even in peacetime.] (27)

A final note on legacy -- George Marshall was a friend of Palmer and endorsed his citizen army ideas. In the latter days of World War II, Marshall encouraged Palmer to plan a postwar Army. The Army staff itself hoped to maintain a large Regular Army, but Marshall, politically astute, encouraged Palmer to argue the case for an armed force that relied on reserves and UMT. One result was Circular 347 of
August 1944, which compared German-like standing armies and armies based on citizen reserves. (64)
The public reaction was "emphatically favorable," striking "some inner chord" in the popular mind (24, p. 661) that continues to vibrate to this day.

VI. THE ROLE OF JOHN MCAULEY PALMER: ALPHA AND OMEGA

The National Defense Act as passed most closely resembled the Wadsworth bill, sans UMT. The individual given the most credit for that bill was Colonel Palmer, on loan from the War Department to the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

The roots of Palmer's ideas concerning a citizen army are more Jeffersonian than Washingtonian, according to Weigley in *Towards an American Army*. (77) Another major influence was his grandfather of the same name, who served in the Civil War with General John Logan, author of *The Volunteer Soldier*. (34)

An historical debate centers upon Palmer's discovery of not Jefferson but Washington, particularly his May 1783 "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," in which the Continental Army commander called for a strong militia, rather than reliance upon a large Regular Army. Recognizing the eternal appeal of Washington, Palmer was delighted with his find while conducting research in the Library of Congress in late 1927-early 1928. (24) Here was the historical authority for the citizen army that he had been seeking. More recently, a scholar, Richard Kohn, has cast doubt on the seriousness of Washington's statement, pointing out that the commander was parroting his subordinates and was acting out of political expediency (half a Regular Army loaf is better than none). When Washington says a large standing army is dangerous to the liberties of a country, Kohn sees "large" and Palmer sees "dangerous" as the keywords, possibly merely reflecting their own political biases. It is worth noting that Washington's paper was delivered about as long after Yorktown as the NDA followed the Armistice in Europe. In both cases the nation was tired of war and needed assurance a large standing army would not pursue further adventures. Palmer's interpretation was itself more politically expedient for his time than Kohn's was for his (at the end of the Vietnam War). Not so incidentally, Weigley agrees with Kohn that Palmer did not realize the depth of Washington's commitment to professionalism. (29, 42, 74, 77)

Palmer's first written argument for a large federalized citizen army as the major defense of the United States is his 1912 "Organization of the Land Forces." As mentioned earlier, his wartime experiences reinforced his faith in the citizen army.

Four of his books, one written before America entered the war and three later, are major documents for any study of NDA:

*An Army of the People* (1916). Before Palmer discovered Washington, he discovered the Swiss model. (43)

*Statesmanship or War* (1927), advocating the Swiss model. A citizen army can keep the world safe for democracy so that a large professional army is not needed to make it so. It is noteworthy that Palmer never posits an either/or for citizen-soldiers and regulars, implying a professional army of some size is needed. (45)
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Washington, Lincoln, Wilson (1930), in the epilogue of which he discusses the Washingtonian roots of his opposition to Uptonianism. (46)

General Von Steuben (1937), the trainer of the citizens. (44)

America in Arms (1941), his major historical argument, which includes his memoir about NDA and its legacy. (42)

Praise of Palmer's influence is found in House and Lee. Lee notes that Palmer "always thought firstly of the well-being of American democracy and secondly of the United States Army." (33, p. vii) Relating Palmer to today's Army, rather than casting him as an institutional maverick, House says, "The current total force structure . . . is too close an approximation of Palmer's ideas to be sheer coincidence." (25, p. 18)

VII. AN HISTORICAL ENTERTAINMENT - UPTON VS. PALMER

The concept of a citizen army is either the most stimulating intellectual question surrounding NDA or it is a non-issue -- a non-issue if one considers that the modern professional or standing armed forces of the United States comprise two million men, yet we congratulate ourselves for our reliance on a strong Total Force, well-integrated Reserves and a National Guard. There is an ambivalence about where we stand on the political scale that has Upton on the right and Palmer on the left. And that ambivalence is revealed in historical opinion.

Also, it is simplistic to view the National Defense Act as the result of a struggle between Uptonians and Palmerites. The citizen army envisioned by Palmer and sanctified by the NDA little resembled the traditional citizen army. Federal control of the populace was inarguable in World War I and the return to a Swiss-like, pre-industrial enclave not possible. Local control of militia was lost; instead, its fate was closely bound to the federal military establishment. The 1933 Act tightened this federal control that Palmer himself never resisted. Since 1920, the citizen army has actually been an established or standing army as the term has been used historically. "Citizen Army" is now an anachronism. (14, 15)

In our own time enough of a difference, at least intellectually, remains between the concepts of a professional and citizen army that one can usefully study the tension between the (variously labeled) neo-Hamiltonian/Germanic/Uptonians and the Jeffersonian/Swiss/Palmerites. In the Reagan years, the press reported a debate at high levels concerning the use of military force that had echoes of the older tension. Secretary of State Schultz preferred using small professional forces for quick strikes, while Secretary of Defense Weinberger was chary of such use until the American public had been won over to a larger military solution to the (by-then) festering problem. Schultz reflected an Uptonian divorce from the society, while Weinberger sought to turn an apathetic public into a war-marching citizenry.

The debate in the NDA era often focused on centralization or federalization in contrast to local control or states' rights. Even within the War Department the debate had its parallel --Secretary Baker and his Chief of Staff versus the bureaus. (21) The states' rights argument of the National Guard is most prominently featured in Colby. (9) Palmer argued in Statesman-ship or War and in America in Arms that the reserves needed to run their own training, as did the Swiss. He lamented the ability of the Regular Army in times
of draw down to usurp that role. Palmer also hoped that a centrifugal, anti-centralizing force would be
generated by insinuating citizen-like officers onto the General Staff committees and by granting defense policy powers to the War Council. (42, 45) To Vandiver the creation of that Council reflected Congressional fear of a Germanic General Staff. (72) The Council, however, was not a success, a comfort to Uptonians. It met infrequently and was largely ignored. (22)

Without question, the key synthesizing historical work on the Upton/Palmer debate is Weigley, Towards an American Army. (77) Its evidence and arguments will not be repeated here. The two most important primary sources are Upton's Military Policy and Palmer's America in Arms. (71, 42)

In the game of intellectual labelling, March and Baker appear to line up with Root, Upton, Sherman and Calhoun (and Washington, if you trust Kohn), because they sought to retain in the General Staff a lordly portion of defense policy-making power. (42)

In the interwar period, the lines were blurred. Both camps pursued the goal of preparing for a massive wartime army. The Uptonian General Staff's mobilization plan found a place for the National Guard. (75)

During World War II, a called-up citizenry made up the great mass of military force. Following demobilization, a Cold War stoked the military fever sufficiently so that conscription continued through the Vietnam War (with a brief interlude in 1947). It is after that war that a public that wished to buy its way out of its responsibilities returned to a volunteer professional army. In the 1990s, America's enthusiasm for things military is sufficiently strong and its wallet sufficiently weak that today the Palmerian total force concept is widely accepted both within the Regular Army and in the larger society.

**Historical Asides:**

(A question not addressed in the literature surveyed, although implied by Ekirch, is whether the highly federalized citizen army, with on-again, off-again conscription, actually contributed to a militarizing of America that was more successful than if the Uptonians had won a more purely professional army. In a citizen army environment, a symbiotic relationship exists between the military and the civilian society -- values are exchanged. A professional army is more isolated and in-bred, and exchanges fewer "value genes" with the society it defends. Because the military in a citizen army environment is made more humane through that exchange, it is more effective politically and geopolitically. And the society, because of its instilled military values, can more successfully exert an hegemony in its non-military relationships with other societies. But the civilian-military relationship remains sterile if the citizen army does not rest upon some sort of universal service, a fact well understood by Palmer, who as much as Marshall foresaw America as the dominant power of this century.)

(Another question that is generated by a study of the history of NDA is the influence of UMT or conscription upon both Uptonian and Palmerite arguments. To an Uptonian, the draftees are merely soldiers to be commanded in the "expansible" army. To a Palmerite, the draftees are both officers and enlisted men who "save the marriage" of the society and its army. How adaptable is each to a peacetime that lacks conscription? Without some sort of universal service requirement the debate assumes a
different character.)
SOURCES


6. Cavalry Journal 28-30 (1919-1921). Per. Includes such articles as:


   Not on file in MHI--borrowed from University of Pittsburgh.

   Includes a legislative history of both the 1916 and 1920 National Defense Acts and military bills and acts between those years. See Chapter IX on the 1920 Act.


   See Chapter XIII, "Disillusionment & Partial Disarmament."


   National Defense Act is linked to earlier Root reforms, rather than a decoupling from the Uptonians.


   For example:


   Not on file in MHI--borrowed from Ohio University, Athens.

   Not focusing specifically on the 1920 Act, the author examines three aspects of postwar organization: the National Guard's role in national defense; the General Staff; and manpower procurement.


   pp. 463 and 483-90 E181G17.


   See Chapter 2, "The Army in 1920." Describes the Army's difficulties filling the ranks after the War ended, during a period of huge demobilization and no draft and, until the National Defense Act, no clear policies on manpower.


26. Huidekoper, Frederic Louis. Is the United States Prepared for War? NY: North Amer Rev, May 1907. 47 p. UA23.H8. This is merely one of many, many official, quasi-official and unofficial "Preparedness Movement" speeches, articles & books calling attention to the need to reorganize the Army & re-direct the community spirit of the American people into more virile channels, ready to face threats from abroad. These materials illuminate the ideas and anxieties that lay behind the 1916 Act, which, in turn, was amended by the 1920 Act.


Provides historical perspectives for the manpower procurement aspects of the Act. See, especially, Chapter XII, "Early Mobilization Planning, 1919-1931."


See Chapter XXIII, "Reorganizing the Army After War."


A history of the Universal Military Training aspects of the National Defense Act of 1916 and 1920 legislation, particularly Senate and House debate on Universal Military Training and the efforts of lobbyists.


See Chapter VI, "Consolidating the General Staff Concept After World War I."


The debate on the National Defense Act can be followed through use of its quarterly _Index_. See especially the entries under "U.S.--Congress--Bills--Army Reorganization."

   A key work on the history of the Act.

   Argument by a key figure.


   Advocates a citizen army, a la Swiss model.

   In the "Epilogue," he discusses the Washingtonian roots of the National Defense Act and the Uptonian opposition.


   See Chapter IX.


   See Chapter XXVII, "Reorganization."

   The other authors contributing to this collection of six articles were Army officers.
   Submitted in 1912. Written by John McAuley Palmer, according to Holley, Chap 15.

   Numerous studies prepared in 1915 on the question of the proper organization and strength of the Regular Army and Organized Militia.

   By which one can trace the amendments to S. 3792 (the Wadsworth bill) that resulted from hearings and from House/Senate conferences.

   Hearings on H.R. 8287 on reorganizing the Army; H.R. 8068 on Universal Military Training; H.R. 7925 on creation of a Department of Aeronautics; and H.R. 8870 on making "more effective provision for the national defense." Some printings of this document include hearings on H.R. 9204 (a bill to increase military pay).

   "Historical documents relating to the reorganization plans of the War Department and to the present National Defense Act."

   A useful compilation by which changes can be traced. Several similar compilations were published between 1920 and 1942.

   Testimony by Secretary of War Newton Baker on S. 3792, given January 21, 1920; not to be confused with his testimony on the same subject on August 18, 1919 (see UA25.5.A533).

   Hearings on three bills: S. 2691 on Universal Military Training; S. 2693 on creation on a Department of Aeronautics and U.S. Air Force; and S. 2715 on reorganizing the Army.
For the use of Army officers addressing the public, covering the necessity of preparedness, its costs and "by-product" benefits. The last 25 pages contain an explanation of the recent National Defense Act.

This conference was called to discuss the provisions of NDA concerning the training of civilian components of the Army of the United States.

See pp. 424-83. Pages 455-83 contain the little-discussed section of the Act pertaining to the Articles of War and the military justice system. The Act was distributed throughout the Army as War Department Bulletin No. 25, dated June 9, 1920, 68 p.

64. ____. Circular No. 347, dated 25 August 1944. 7 p. MilPub-Circ.
See pp. 4-6. Under General Marshall's signature, this is Palmer's statement of principles on the differences between standing armies and armies based on citizen reserves, the former identified with Germany and Japan.

And other editions.

Includes a table by which one can trace changes, section by section, in the 1916 Act.

Addresses the current status of the Regular Army, National Guard, Organized Reserves, ROTC, and Citizens' Military Training Camps, and the issues of numbers of commissioned officers and total costs of maintaining the Army.

See pp. 58-58, Secretary of War Baker's plea for a reorganized Army that had learned from its war experiences. Describes bill prepared by the Chief of Staff for consideration of both houses.


