ANTI-INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES

A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources

Essentially, this involves countering unconventional forces, such as intelligence agents, spies, saboteurs, or special forces are dropped or inserted behind a front line, or when native resistance fighters, guerrillas, or partisans surface in the rear of an armed force. The Germans in WWII faced inserted agents of (OSS, SOE) and native resistance fighters in France, Russia, Italy, Greece, etc. The Japanese also faced guerrilla forces in the Philippines and Burma. Anti-infiltration techniques or tactics include:

1. Use of outposts, including night listening posts, to protect weak areas between the strong redoubts.
2. Night illumination and use of infrared.
3. Organization of blocking units (e.g., German "sperrveband") against large infiltration units.
4. Air and ground surveillance, particularly of known drop zones.
5. Use of camouflage and deception during known periods of enemy air reconnaissance.
6. Increased security of key rear area facilities.
7. Harsh treatment of civilians collaborating with infiltrations, but not random brutality of entire local populaces.
8. Dissemination throughout the populace of descriptions of infiltrators and their techniques, with a reward system and network of informers.
9. Use of special identification devices to counter attempts to use friendly uniforms.
10. Booby trapping known drop zones or avenues of approach.
11. Use of war dogs.
12. Tight control of stragglers and refugees, among whom infiltrators mingle.
13. Use of friendly guerrilla forces or small mobile "hit squads" to seek out and destroy infiltrators.
SOURCES


See Chap V, "German Anti-partisan Measures."


See esp. pp. 54-58 on planning and pp. 72-75 on actual operations.  Against large air-dropped forces, see pp. 59-67, on anti-airborne tactics.


Friendly counterguerrilla forces were recruited and organized as the ethnic 7th SS Div and used to ferret out Greek partisans.  "Prinz Eugen".


Makes the point that partisan disruptions were much less effective in areas near German combat troops than in areas under occupation forces.  The latter troops treated the populace much more harshly.  See the conclusions on pp. 34-39.  Note especially the conclusion about the need for constant patrolling and for small, speedy motorized forces; also, the suggestion that the best defense of key rear areas is a good offense directed at the partisans' strongholds; also, that the rear security duties should be in the hands of well-trained troops, not aged or invalid soldiers.


See Chap 17.


See also:

-Bibliographies on Dogs in Animals; OSS in Intelligence-WWII; Resistance Activities in WWII-General.